Establishment Clause and Justice Scalia: What the Future Holds for Church and State by Schlosser, Jay
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 63 | Issue 3 Article 6
1-1-1988
Establishment Clause and Justice Scalia: What the
Future Holds for Church and State
Jay Schlosser
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jay Schlosser, Establishment Clause and Justice Scalia: What the Future Holds for Church and State, 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 380 (1988).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol63/iss3/6
The Establishment Clause and Justice Scalia: What the
Future Holds for Church and State.
One of the most difficult problems faced by the Supreme Court to-
day is alleviating the tension between the establishment clause and the
free exercise clause of the first amendment.1 A statute passed to ensure
the right to freely exercise one's religious beliefs arguably establishes
religion. Yet if that same statute is struck down by a court, the court
arguably interferes with one's right to the free exercise of religious be-
liefs. Clearly, this puts the court in a difficult situation. 2 This note will
focus on the establishment clause in its discussion of this situation.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,3 the Supreme Court promulgated a three-
prong test to determine if a violation of the establishment clause has oc-
curred. Although still used by the Court today, the Lemon test has been
highly criticized as being unpredictable and unclear in its application 4
and the Court has split on the continued use of the test.5 The recent
appointments of Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Anthony Kennedy
could have a dramatic effect on the future of Lemon.
This note will attempt to provide some insight into the jurispruden-
tial philosophy ofJustice Scalia in this area of the first amendment. Part I
will briefly discuss the history of the Court's treatment of the establish-
ment clause. Part II will outline the general jurisprudential philosophy
ofJustice Scalia, concentrating on the main doctrines that form the basis
of his philosophy. Part III will attempt to unfoldJustice Scalia's views in
the area of establishment of religion. Part IV will conclude that Justice
Scalia's distaste for the unpredictability of the Lemon test will further di-
1 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) (if either clause were
"expanded to a logical extreme," it "would tend to clash with the other"). See also Developments in the
Law: Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1717-1722 (1987) [hereinafter cited as Develop-
ments]; Choper, The Religion Clauses of the 1st Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673
(1980).
2 Scholars have suggested alleviating this tension between the clauses by asserting the priority
of the free exercise clause over the establishment clause. See, e.g., Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonest-
ablishment and Doctrinal Development: Part I. The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381,
1389 (1967) (stating the conflict requires a value judgment to see which clause will prevail-"the one
premised on a vital civil right [free exercise], or the one premised on an outmoded eighteenth cen-
tury political theory [establishment]"); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrrIONAL LAW § 14-7, at 833
(1978) (giving preference to the free exercise clause because it "is the natural result of tolerating
religion as broadly as possible rather than thwarting at all costs even the faintest appearance of
establishment"). But see Choper, Defining "Religion " in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579
(stressing equal readings of both clauses because of the separate and independent values of each
clause).
3 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See infra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
4 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2607 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 89, 91, 108 (1985) (Burger, CJ., White, J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Comm. for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980); Developments,
supra note 1, at 1680 (the Lemon "test has become a hindrance to a more clearly articulated view of
the establishment clause"). But see Cox, The Lemon Test Soured: The Supreme Court's New Establishment
Clause Analysis, 37 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1175, 1198 (Oct. 1984) (arguing the need for the flexibility of
Lemon to keep from infringing on free exercise rights).
5 See infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
vide the Court and put the future of the Lemon test in the hands of the
newest appointee to the Court, Justice Kennedy.
6
I. The Establishment Clause: A Brief History
The first amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the
government from passing any law "respecting the establishment of reli-
gion."' 7 In 1971, the Supreme Court, in Lemon v. Kurtzman,8 established a
three-prong test to handle cases that dealt with the establishment of reli-
gion. To pass an establishment clause challenge: (1) a statute must have
a secular purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect must neither advance
nor inhibit religion; and (3) the statute must not foster an excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion.9 The Court has used this test for
seventeen years in every case dealing with the establishment clause, with
one exception. 10 Although the meaning of the prongs has fluctuated, the
literal language of the test has not changed since its inception."
For many years, the Lemon test has been highly criticized by com-
mentators as not ensuring the values the establishment clause was in-
tended to protect. 12 Even members of the Court have begun to question
6 Justice Kennedy was unamimously confirmed by the Senate in February 9, 1988. 56 U.S.L.W.
2436 (1988).
7 U.S. CONST. amend. I. What this phrase actually means has been a continuing source of con-
troversy among legal scholars. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) ("a wall of
separation between church and state", (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878))); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952) (the establishment clause "does not say that in
every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously defines
the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the
other"); Beschle, The Conservative as Liberak The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach of
Justice O'Connor, 62 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 151 (1987) ("liberal neutrality"). The history of the rela-
tionship between church and state in the courts is long and complex. This section of the note in no
way purports to be a complete history of the Court's treatment of the establishment clause. It simply
attempts to give the reader some background into areas of importance for a clearer understanding of
Justice Scalia's philosophy.
8 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, the Court used the new test to invalidate two school plans that
reimbursed non-public schools for such things as teachers' salaries, textbooks and instruction mater-
ials because they failed to pass the excessive entanglement clause of the test. Id. at 607.
9 Id. at 612-13. The prongs were actually laid out first in different cases but finally brought
together by the Lemon Court (the secular purpose and primary effect prongs, see School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); the excessive entanglement prong, see
Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
10 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 63 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The one exception being
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (The Court rejected a challenge to first amendment for
having a chaplain say invocation before the Nebraska legislature because of the historical tradition of
such an activity.) See also Cox, supra note 4, for a good discussion of the consequences of not using
Lemon.
11 See Scalia, On Making It Look Easy By Doing It Wrong: A Critical View of the Justice Department, in
PRIVATE SCHOoLs AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 175 (1981) ("the three-part test has not been consistently
followed since 1971"). See also the changing interpretation of the primary effects test to "a" primary
effect (Comm. for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, Comm'r of Educ. of New York, 413
U.S. 756, 773 (1973)) then back to "the" primary effect (Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 396 (1983));
the use of history and tradition in the analysis of the secular purpose of the creche in the city Christ-
mas display (Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 688 (1984); see infra note 14); for a good discussion of this
use of history in Lynch, see Cox, supra note 4, at 1190-98 (arguing the Court did not really apply the
Lemon test but simply used a historical analysis to uphold the validity of the Christmas display). For
the most recent case in which the Court employs the original language of the Lemon test, see Edwards
v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2577 (1987).
12 See supra note 4.
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the continued use of the test.13 Despite the constant criticism of the test,
the Court continues to use it when dealing with establishment questions.
Before the retirement of Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger, the
Lemon test had support from the majority of the Court. However, the
addition of the two new members to the Court may result in the aban-
donment or reformation of Lemon.
In Lynch V Donnelly,14 Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
promulgated an alternative to the Lemon test. Although the reformation
of the test appears slight, there are some differences that could be impor-
tant to religious jurisprudence. However, Justice O'Connor has failed, at
this point, to convince a majority of the Court to follow her views.
O'Connor's test asks: (1) whether the government intends to convey a
message of endorsement of religion; (2) whether the government does
convey a message of endorsement of religion; and (3) whether there is an
excessive entanglement between government and religion.' 5
A. Lemon v. Justice O'Connor
Under Lemon's secular purpose test the Court must find a secular
purpose of some type for the government action in question.' 6 Under
O'Connor's more rigid test the court must find that the government ac-
tually intended to endorse a religious belief. Rather than having courts
search for a secular purpose within a statute, O'Connor's approach
would have the courts searching for an intention to endorse religion.
This changes the focus of analysis and allows deference to the legislature
in the absence of an intent to endorse religion. O'Connor's approach
has been interpreted in different ways.' 7 It would seem, however,
through her application of the test,'8 that the correct interpretation
would be to invalidate a statute only if the main purpose for passing the
statute were an intent to endorse or favor a religious belief. Therefore,
13 See infra note 4, and supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text for the views of several Justices
on the Court.
14 465 U.S. 668 (1984). The Court applied the Lemon test and held that a city Christmas display
with a creche did not violate the establishment clause. The Court found that celebrating a holiday
such as Christmas by depicting the origins of the holiday was a legitimate secular purpose. Addition-
ally, any benefit to religion was "indirect, remote and incidental". Finally, there was no evidence of
any contact between church and state concerning the display. Id. at 680-685.
15 Id. at 687-692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
16 There have been arguments both that this prong can be easily applied and that it is too vague
to apply. See Cox, supra note 4, at 1180-81 (arguing the simplicity of the test). But see Edwards, 107 S.
Ct. at 2607 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing the prong "sacrifices clarity and predictability for
flexibility") (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662
(1980)).
17 See Simpson, Lemon Reconstituted: Justice O'Connor's Proposed Modifications of the Lemon Test for Es-
tablishment Clause Violations, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 465, 471 (arguing that if any improper purpose is
found then the statute is unconstitutional; also arguing that O'Connor misapplied her own test in
Lynch, id. at n. 38); Beschle, supra note 7, at 187 (arguing O'Connor's misapplication of her own
test). But see Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Wallace v. Jafree, 472 U.S. 38, 70
(1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). It is difficult to see how one can misapply one's own recently
promulgated test. Despite the fact that some commentators may say Justice O'Connor's test is
vague, her application of it gives clear meaning to how she feels the test should be interpreted.
18 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring) and Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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O'Connor's test would allow legislation that had some religious basis to
pass the Court's analysis.19
The "primary effects" prong of the Lemon test has been considerably
more difficult for the Court to apply.20 In applying the test the Court has
looked to the effect the statute has on religion. On the other hand, with
Justice O'Connor's test, the Court would look to the message the statute
conveys.2 1 This would allow the Court to consider the message the gov-
ernment is conveying to members of minority religions, a major criticism
of the Lemon test.22 In Wallace v.Jaffree,23 Justice O'Connor further added
to this "message" prong of her test by viewing it through the eyes of an
"objective observer," thus allowing courts to see the message conveyed
to both majority and minority religious groups.
24
The excessive entanglement prong of Lemon and O'Connor's tests
are very similar. The only difference is that Justice O'Connor seems to
limit her test to "institutional entanglement" 25 while the Court in apply-
ing Lemon has also considered political divisiveness as a factor.26 Inter-
estingly, in Aguilar v. Felton,27 Justice O'Connor questioned the validity of
the excessive entanglement clause altogether, and came close to aban-
doning it and limiting the test to two prongs.
28
19 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating "[t]he endorsement test does not
preclude government from acknowledging religion or from taking religion into account in making
law and policy").
20 See Beschle, supra note 7, at 171; Developments, supra note 1; and Comment, Grand Rapids
School District v. Ball and Aguilar v. Felton: Confusion in Applying Lemon v. Kurtzman s Effects and Entangle-
ment Tests, 50 At.AN L. REv. 811, 827 (1986) (arguing a Catch-22 situation because a statute cannot
satisfy the effects prong without creating an excessive entanglement).
21 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
22 See L. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARv. L. REv. 592,
611 (1985). AlthoughJustice O'Connor feels that her test allows the Court to consider the message
conveyed to minorities (see Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69, 70 (O'Connor,J., concurring); Lynch, 465 U.S. at
688, 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring)), some commentators believe the Court needs to go even fur-
ther in considering the viewpoints of minority religions (see Developments, supra note 1, at 1646-47
(arguing that the O'Connor test reaches the same result as Lemon and there is a need to consider it
through the eyes of the minority religious groups to apply correctly)).
23 472 U.S. 38 (1985). See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
24 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring). By looking at the statute through the eyes
of an objective observer one can consider if nonadherents (minority religions) to a religious practice
see themselves as outsiders and, in addition, if adherents (majority religions) to a religious practice
see themselves as insiders or favored members of society. ForJustice O'Connor's continuing appli-
cation of the objective observer aspect of her test see Witters v. Washington Department of Services
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,493 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) and Thorton v. Caldor, 472 U.S.
703, 711 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
25 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that determining political divisive-
ness "is simply too speculative an enterprise"; the inquiry should focus "on the character of the
government activity that might cause such divisiveness, not on the divisiveness itself").
26 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622; Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 794 (1973); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975).
27 473 U.S. 402 (1985). The Court struck down a New York program which paid the salaries for
some employees to teach in parochial schools, under state regulation, because it feared excessive
entanglement in the future. The Court determined the New York plan would require constant state
monitoring to ensure no religious beliefs were intentionally or unintentionally advanced. Addition-
ally, public and parochial schools would be working together in resolving administrative matters thus
increasing entanglement between church and state. Id. at 408-414.
28 Id. at 430 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated, "If a statute lacks a purpose
or effect of advancing or endorsing religion, I would not invalidate it merely because it requires
some ongoing cooperation between church and state or some state supervision to ensure that state
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While Justice O'Connor's approach differs only slightly from Lemon,
it does allow the court to use more of an accommodating approach to
church-state relations than does the approach allowed by Lemon29 Jus-
tice O'Connor is not alone in her reconsideration of the long-standing
Lemon test. A number of scholars have tried to develop different ap-
proaches to handle the establishment problem.3 0 Although other Jus-
tices on the Court have questioned the continued use of Lemon, Justice
O'Connor remains the only Justice to enunciate a viable alternative to
the test.
B. Division of the Court
Wallace v. Jafree 31 clearly illustrates the split among the Justices con-
cerning Lemon. Justice Stevens, writing the majority opinion in Wallace,
used Lemon to declare unconstitutional an Alabama statute providing for
a one-minute period of silence in public schools "for meditation or vol-
untary prayer".32 Justice Powell concurred, expressing his views on the
continuing validity of Lemon.33 Justice O'Connor restated her reforma-
tion of Lemon in a concurrence.3 4 In dissent, ChiefJustice Burger, Justice
White, and Justice Rehnquist expressed their dissatisfaction with the
Lemon test.3 5 Justice Rehnquist, the most adamant of the group, stated
that the purpose and effect clauses of Lemon were in "no way based on
either the language or intent of the drafters.
36
At that time the Court was split at five to four. Since then Justice
Powell and Chief Justice Burger have retired, thus taking one from each
side of the argument and leaving the Court at four to three in favor of the
Lemon test. Chief Justice Burger was replaced by Justice Rehnquist and
his position was filled by Justice Scalia.3 7 Justice Powell was replaced by
Justice Kennedy.38 If Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia oppose Lemon,
funds do not advance religion." Id. However, Justice O'Connor has not advanced this notion in any
of her opinions since Aguillar.
29 Beschle, supra note 6, at 176 (stating "[i]iberal neutrality [essentially Justice O'Connor's ap-
proach] will often tolerate, if not require, contact and cooperation between government and
religion").
30 See, e.g., Comment, supra note 20 (proposing an "impermissible relations" test); Developments,
supra note 1, at 1648 (proposing a consideration from the minority religions, viewpoint of the
message conveyed); Beschele, supra note 7 (proposing a "liberal neutrality" approach), and Cox,
supra note 4 (proposing a combination of Lemon and a historical approach).
31 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
32 Id. at 56.
33 Id. at 62. Justice Powell noted that the Lemon test is the only test for establishment concerns
that the Court has ever adopted and added that the test "identifies standards that have proved useful
in analyzing case after case both in our decisions and in those of other courts." Id. at 63.
34 Id. at 67-84. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
35 Id. at 85-114. ChiefJustice Burger stated that the court's use of Lemon "suggests a naive pre-
occupation with an easy, bright-line approach for addressing constitutional issues" and cautioned
that Lemon only provided "signposts," not a strict per se rule. Id. at 89. Justice White called for a
reconsideration of Lemon. Id. at 91. Justice Rehnquist stated that because the Lemon test is "difficult
to apply and yields unprincipled results, I see little use in it" and that it "has produced only consis-
tent unpredictability." Id. at 112.
36 Id. at 108 (stating that it has the same historical deficiencies as the "wall of separation" con-
cept, see supra note 7 and accompanying text).
37 Justice Antonin Scalia was nominated by President Reagan, affirmed by the Senate, and ap-
pointed to the court in 1986. 56 U.S.L.W. 2168 (1986).
38 See supra note 6.
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NOTES
the Court could announce a new standard to guide establishment cases
in the near future. The remainder of this note will focus on Justice
Scalia's jurisprudential views, and will suggest for which side of the
Lemon debate his vote will be cast in the future.
II. Justice Scalia's Jurisprudential Philosophy
Justice Antonin Scalia's nomination and appointment to the
Supreme Court in 1986 came after a distinguished four years on the Cir-
cuit Court for the District of Columbia.3 9 Justice Scalia graduated Magna
Cum Laude from Harvard Law School in 1960. Before being appointed
to the circuit court Justice Scalia taught law at the University of Chicago
and the University of Virginia.
There are three major areas of the law which comprise most ofJus-
tice Scalia's legal writing and which help formulate much of his philoso-
phy: administrative law, statutory interpretation, and first amendment
freedom of the press concerns. 40 Several fundamental beliefs become
apparent upon close examination of Justice Scalia's work.
A. Justice Scalia's Beliefs
Justice Scalia stongly believes in the narrow role of the Court in the
judicial process. A strong advocate ofjudicial restraint, Justice Scalia has
consistently criticized the Court for becoming too "active".41 Justice
Scalia believes the Court has become too powerful in the past years for
three major reasons. First, he believes that law schools place undue em-
phasis on policy arguments when discussing rules of law set by prece-
dent. This, he believes, has forced the judiciary to make rulings which
make "social sense".42 This is good practice for law schools, for legisla-
tors, and for the people, but for the judiciary it is "entirely unwork-
39 Justice Scalia was appointed to the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia in August of
1982. Nomination ofJudge Antonin Scalia: Hearings before the Committee on theJudiciay, U.S. Senate, S. Hrg.
99-1064,, 99th Cong., 2nd Session 1, 1-2 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings].
40 See Note, The Appellate Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 54 U. OF CHic. L. REv. 705, 705
(Spr. 1987). (Administrative law: see Center for Auto Safety v. N.H.T.S.A., 793 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (ScaliaJ., dissenting); Community Nutrition Institute v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(ScaliaJ., concurring in part); Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False Remedy for System Overload, 8 REGULA-
TION 19 (Nov.-Dec. 1979). Statutory Interpretation: see United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); Illinois Commerce Com'n v. I.C.C., 749 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Gott v. Walters, 756
F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 791 F.2d 172 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc). First
amendment: see infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.)
41 See Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1197 (Scalia,J., dissenting) (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'du, 470
U.S. 821 (1985) (urging judicial restraint in review of administrative agencies); Hearings, supra note
39, at 267 ("justice Scalia is a strong advocate ofjudicial restraint-limiting the role of courts in our
society and restricting access to the courts."); Scalia, THEJUDGES ARE COMING, reprinted in 126 Cong.
Rec. 18920-22 (1980) (Extensions of Remarks: Judicial Malpractice) (stating three reasons why the
Court's power has increased and facilitated the emergence of the '"judge-legislator" (see infra notes
41-49 and accompanying text)) [hereinafter 126 Cong. Rec.].
42 126 Cong. Rec. at 18921, col. 3 (stating "[b]ecause opinions differ widely about predictable
social effects and, for that matter, about their desirability, policy analysis is a jurisprudential founda-
tion of shifting sand").
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able". 43 Justice Scalia feels that this new attitude in law schools has
fostered the emergence of the "judge-legislator".44
A second reason Justice Scalia puts forth for the increase in the
Court's power is the lenience with which the judiciary has interpreted the
doctrine of standing.45 Justice Scalia believes the Court has broadened
the standing requirement too far, so as to change the role of the Court
from a protector of individual or minority rights46 to a protector of the
"public at large". 47 Liberalizing standing requirements allows anyone
who has suffered injury to bring a case; not limiting that right, as in the
past, to persons who have suffered an injury different from that suffered
by the public at large.
48
A third reason given by Justice Scalia for the increased power of the
Court is the vagueness of legislative enactments.49 Justice Scalia believes
that because of the political nature of Congress and representatives' ef-
forts to please their constituents, Congress has become increasingly
vague when enacting legislation.50 Because of this lack of clarity in any
given act, numerous disputes arise as to its meaning which only the
courts can resolve. Therefore, the Court must try to interpret this vague
statute and is essentially determining what the law is instead of having
Congress do so through more clearly drafted legislation.
Justice Scalia's strong belief in judicial restraint inevitably leads to
his commitment to the separation of powers doctrine.5 1 This is evi-
denced in his writings and in articles about him.5 2 If the Court refuses to
43 Id. at 18921, col. 3-18922, col. 1. (Instead of asking what makes social sense, the judiciary
should ask "what is the common understanding?" and adhere to precedents.) Id. at 18921, col. 3.
44 Id. at 18922, col. 1.
45 Id. at 18922, col. 1. See also Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation
of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983) (Scalia argues that by limiting the people who can bring
a suit before the Court the doctrine of separation of powers can be advanced because people who do
not suffer an injury different from the public at large will have to turn to the other branches for
protection. Thus, the Court can maintain its role of protecting minority rights.) The standing doc-
trine basically defines who has the right or power to bring a case before the Court.
46 See Scalia, supra note 46, at 894-95 (arguing the role of the court is "protecting individuals and
minorities against impositions of the majority" and that judicial intervention should be limited to
such cases).
47 126 Cong. Rec., supra note 41, at 18922, col. 1 (arguing that Congress has given the Court the
executive function of seeing that the laws are faithfully executed "by providing for judicial review at
the instance of persons who are no more affected by the action in question than any member of the
public").
48 See United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1378-81 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia
indicating his reluctance to ease standing requirements).
49 126 Cong. Rec., supra note 41, at 18922, col. 1-2 ("But Congress has increased judicial power
even more by what it has not done . . . it has repeatedly failed to give anything but the vaguest
content to the laws."). See also OIlman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (questioning the subjectivity and lack of a mechanism to measure "how much defamation
is a decent amount;" showing his emphasis on the need for clarity in the law), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1127 (1985); Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2607 (1987) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
50 126 Cong. Rec., supra note 41, at 18922, col. 2 (stating politicians do not have the "political
stomach" to enact legislation with sufficient clarity).
51 By restraining the action taken by the Court, the other branches are forced to perform their
functions under the Constitution. For instance, if the Court restrains from interpreting a vague law
the legislature must make this law more specific in order to accomplish their goals, thus performing
the legislative function granted to them under article one of the Constitution.
52 See Chapple and Kraus, Rehnquist-Scalia Combined Effect May Far Exceed Current Predictions, NAT'L.
L. J., vol. 9, p. 24, col. 4, Sept. 15, 1986 ("Each [Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia] has
asserted his belief in the separation of powers and his abhorrence of judicial activism."); Scalia, supra
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interpret statutes that are unclear until some guidance is given by the
legislature, it can put more of the impetus on the legislature to make the
laws, advancing the separation of powers doctrine. In addition, if the
Court limits its ability to review administrative agencies, Justice Scalia
believes the legislature and the executive can maintain the separation of
powers originally intended by the Constitution.53 In accordance with
this, Justice Scalia gives great deference to the legislature when it enacts
a statute or regulation that will advance this strong separation of powers
system that he envisions.
54
An interesting area of Justice Scalia's jurisprudence involves the
view he holds regarding Constitutional interpretation. His views place
him somewhere between an "original intent" interpretist and a "living
constitution" interpretist, leaning towards the former.55 However, he
prefers to use the term "original meaning" rather than "original in-
tent".56 In addition, his clarification varies depending on the area of the
constitution to which he refers. 57 He places heavy reliance on the intent
of the framers 58 and the legislative history behind the enactment of that
part of the Constitution affecting the case in question.59 In addition to
note 45 (urging the Court to restrain from expanding the standing doctrine so as to return to the
separation of powers notion originally intended by the Constitution).
53 Justice Scalia stated: "We [the Court] are not the only public officials endowed with intelli-
gence and worthy of trust, and our system of laws has committed the relative evaluation of public
health concerns to others." Chaney, 718 F.2d at 1197 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
54 See Chapple and Kraus, supra note 52, p. 26, col. 7; Note, supra note 39, at 709 (citing Justice
Scalia's opinion in Center For Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d 1322, 1343, 1344, 1345 (D.C. Cir.
1986): "a court should defer to the political mechanisms by which that society acts"); Scalia, supra
note 10, at 182 ("I would prefer to ground the preferential treatment of federal statutes in the
educational policy field upon the deference generally to be accorded constitutional determinations
of the national Congress. . . "). See also infra note 65 and accompanying text.
55 See Hearings, supra note 39, at 48-49 (SenatorJoe Biden's questioning in the nomination pro-
ceedings elicited this response from Justice Scalia: "[A]s I said earlier, I have not developed a full
constitutional matrix. You are right, though, in suspecting me to be more inclined to the original
meaning than I am to a phrase like 'living constitution'."). Id. at 49. Living constitutionalists believe
that the Constitution should expand and contract so as to more accurately reflect the views of the
current society. On the other hand, original intent interpretists feel the Constitution should retain
the intent the framers had when constructing it. For a good discussion of the two theories see Fal-
lon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1189 (1987); Pow-
ell, The Original Understanding of OriginalIntent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885 (1985); Pollack, Constitutional
Interpretation as Political Choice, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 989 (1987); Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Consti-
tution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693 (1976).
56 See Hearings, supra note 39, at 48-49, 193. Justice Scalia defines original meaning as the "most
probable meaning of the words" found by "assessing the meaning that would reasonably have been
conveyed to a citizen at the time the law was enacted, as modified by the relationship of the statute to
later enactments similarly interpreted." Id. at 193. Thus instead of looking to the intent that the
framers had when writing that part of the Constitution he would look to the meaning conveyed to
the people at that time. He would use the same type of "original meaning" analysis when interpret-
ing statutes. Id.
57 See Hearings, supra note 39, at 49 ("There are some provisions of the Constitution that may
have a certain amount of evolutionary content within them.") See also supra note 64 and accompany-
ing text.
58 This note will continue to use the intent of the framers noting that "intent" to Justice Scalia
means "original meaning".
59 See Berger, Benno Schmidt vs. Rehnquist and Scalia, 47 OHIO ST. L. J. 709, 712 (1986); Scalia,
supra note 45; Twenty-Fifth Amendment Proposals Aired in Senate Hearings; Association Position Favors No
Change, 61 ABA J. 599, 604 (May 1975) ("intent of the Constitution itself must stand").
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placing an emphasis on history when interpreting, 60 he trusts and has a
strong desire to maintain the status quo. He believes that long-standing
views in society should be given deference even if contrary to newly
passed legislation.
61
B. Justice Scalia and the First Amendment
Justice Scalia has been reluctant, and feels the Court should be hesi-
tant, to create new rights when dealing with the Constitution in general,
and when dealing with the first amendment in particular. 62 He feels that
the Court should hesitate to create new rights in the Constitution be-
cause of the difficulty in changing the Constitution through the political
process. 63 However, he realizes that references must be made to the
changing times when analyzing the first amendment.r 4 No new rights
should be created, but rather the meaning of those rights should change
with the times. The new rights should be products of the legislative or
political process.
6 5
In sum, we see that Justice Scalia holds strong beliefs in several ar-
eas: separation of powers, judicial restraint, and original meaning.
These beliefs continue throughout Justice Scalia's jurisprudence and
guide him in evaluating all areas of the law. The next section of this note
will attempt to foresee Justice Scalia's religious jurisprudence through
the application of these strongly held beliefs.
60 Although he would rely heavily on the legislative history in interpreting a statute he would not
place the same reliance on legislative committee reports. Lauter, Scalia Sticks to Basics at Senate Judici-
ary Hearing, NAT'L. L.J., vol. 8, p. 4, col. 2, Aug. 18, 1986.
61 See 126 Cong. Rec., supra note 41, at 18922, col.1 (stating "I do not care how analytically
consistent with analogous precedents such a holding might be, nor how socially desirable in the
judge's view. If it contradicts a long and continuing understanding of society.., it is quite simply
wrong."); Hearings, supra note 39, at 205. Thus, it seems he would rather declare new legislation
unconstitutional than to upset the long-standing tradition of society or the Court. See In Agency
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff and Associates, 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2771 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring),
Justice Scalia followed a long-standing case-made rule of applying a state statute of limitations when
there is congressional silence even though he felt it was the wrong approach in that case. In addi-
tion, he criticized the majority for not following it and for adopting a different statute of limitations.
Id. at 2772.
62 See In Re Reporters Committee For Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1336 (D.C. Cir.
1985) [hereinafter In Re Reporters]; Ollman, 750 F.2d at 1037 ("It is difficult to see what valid concern
remains that has not already been addressed by first amendment doctrine and that therefore requires
some constitutional evolving .... ). Cases and articles also show his reluctance to expand the
protection of the media in first amendment cases. See e.g. Olman, 750 F.2d 970; Arkansas Writers'
Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Scalia Decisions in Court of
Appeals Show That New Justice is No Friend of News Media, 10 NEws MEDIA AND THE LAw 3 (Fall 1986).
But see Some Surprises in Scalia's First Months on High Court, L. A. Daily J., Feb. 6, 1987, p. 4 col. 3
(suggesting thatJustice Scalia has not been as unfriendly to the media as originally thought).
63 In Re Reporters, 773 F.2d at 1336.
64 See 126 Cong. Rec., supra note 41, at 18922, col. 1 (Justice Scalia states that first amendment
freedoms, along with some other Bill of Rights' freedoms, are meaningless without reference to the
times. "Does the 'free exercise of religion,' for example, permit human sacrifice? Surely not-but
only because the term is to be given meaning by the traditions and understandings of 20th-Century
American rather than 15th-Century Polynesian society."). See infra note 56 and accompanying text
for his general belief that some areas of the Constitution must expand with the times.
65 Olman, 750 F.2d at 1038, ("The identification of modem problems' to be remedied is
quintessentially legislative rather than judicial business-largely because it is such a subjective judg-
ment and that the remedies are to be sought through democratic change rather than through judicial
pronouncement that the Constitution now prohibits what it did not prohibit before.").
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III. The Establishment Clause and Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia has authored only one opinion interpreting the estab-
lishment clause, a dissent, in Edwards v. Aguillard.66 His stinging dissent
in Edwards provides a strong foundation for discerning his religious juris-
prudence in the area of religious establishment and the Lemon test.
Justice Scalia, abiding by his own emphasis on clarity, 67 pulls no
punches in discussing the Lemon test in his dissent. He states:
In the past we have attempted to justify our embarrassing Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence on the ground that it "sacrifices clarity and
predictability for flexibility". . . . I think it time that we sacrifice some
"flexibility" for "clarity and predictability." Abandoning Lemon's pur-
pose test ... would be a good place to start.68
Scalia believes that the purpose prong has no basis in the history or text
of the first amendment language.69 In his dissent in Edwards, he states
that even if the purpose prong is used, the statute's secular purpose
would survive its application.70 He calls for judicial deference to the leg-
islature when a secular purpose is articulated in the legislative history of
the act.
7 1
How far would Justice Scalia go before finding a violation of the es-
tablishment clause? He states that as long as the legislature had "a sin-
cere belief" that there was a secular purpose behind the act he would
declare it constitutional. 72 Although he calls for the abandonment of the
purpose prong altogether, it seems possible he can be convinced to fol-
low Justice O'Connor's reformation of the purpose prong.73 This refor-
66 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987). The Court stuck down a Louisana statute requiring teaching of crea-
tionism if evolution was taught, on the grounds that there was no secular purpose.
67 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. See also O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492,
1505 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I ... object to the formulation of a standard so devoid of
content that it produces rather than eliminates uncertainty in this field."); Johnson v. Transp.
Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1465 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Scalia begans his dissent stating,
"[w]ith a clarity which, had it not proven unavailing, one might well recommend as a model of
statutory draftmanship Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 declares ... .
68 Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2607 (citations omitted).
69 Edwards, at 107 S. Ct. at 2605. Justice Scalia emphasized the need to base interpretation of
the Constitution on the language, history and text of the Constitution. See American Trucking Asso-
ciation v. Scheimer, 107 S. Ct. 2829, 2851 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I do not believe that test
can be derived from the Constitution."); Tyler Pipe Industries v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, 107
S. Ct. 2810, 2823 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating the Court has gone as far in the commerce
clause so as to depart from the textual meaning of the Constitution). Other justices and scholars
assert that there is no basis for the Lemon test in general in the history or text of the first amendment,
see Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91-92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring); Choper, supra note 1, at 678-680; Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religious
Clause of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 ViLL. L. REV. 3, 17-23 (1978-79).
70 Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2593.
71 Id. at 2596. For Justice Scalia's views on deference see supra note 53 and accompanying text.
See also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1653 (1987) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (stating that if a state's corporation law is not discriminatory it should survive commerce clause
scrutiny; "[b]eyond that, it is for Congress to prescribe its validity").
72 Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2593. (Scalia states he would find this "sincere belief" to be sufficient
"regardless of whether that purpose is likely to be achieved by the provision they enacted.")
73 See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. For other first amendment areas ofjurispruden-
tial agreement between Scalia and O'Connor see Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (Scalia is joined by O'Connor in criticizing the majority of the Court for ex-
pansion of the definition of "public concern" in protection of speech cases. Id. at 2901-02.); Tash-
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mation would allow judicial deference because it would require the party
challenging the statute to show the legislature's intent to advance reli-
gion in order to prove a violation. Without such a showing, the Court
would defer to the legislature and would presume that the statute did not
endorse or advance religion unconstitutionally. 74 This would also ad-
vance Justice Scalia's views on separation of powers75 and judicial re-
straint. 76 Additionally, Justice O'Connor's approach seems to have a
strong basis in the language of the first amendment 77 because of the
prohibiting nature of her test and the parallel prohibiting language of the
first amendment.
78
Justice O'Connor's second prong also seems to parallel the beliefs
expressed by Justice Scalia. This prong requires that the statute convey a
message endorsing religion through the eyes of an objective observer.
79
Although some commentators disagree,80 Justice O'Connor believes that
this allows the Court to view the effects on minority religions. 8' Justice
Scalia's view, that the Court's narrow role is to protect minority inter-
ests, 82 seems to be advanced by this reformation of the effects test. This
would return the Court to its proper role, as Justice Scalia sees it, and
thus would protect the minority religious followers from powerful major-
jian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Scalia is joined
by O'Connor in arguing against the application of freedom of association protection to "casual con-
tacts." Id. at 560.)
74 See infra note 87 and accompanying text for circumstances when the government may or must
endorse or advance religion.
75 For his views on separation of powers see supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. See also
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1224 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators' intentions. Where the lan-
guage of those laws is clear, we are not free to replace it with an unenacted legislative intent.").
76 ForJustice Scalia's views on judicial restraint see supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text. See
also Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2542 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating whether to base
the death penalty solely on moral guilt "is a question to be decided through the democratic process
of a free people, and not by the decrees of this Court").
77 See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating the goal in formulating a test
"should be to frame a principle for constitutional adjudication that is not only grounded in the
history and language of the first amendment, but one that is also capable of consistent application to
the relevant problems.' Last Term, I proposed a refinement of the Lemon test with this goal in
mind.") (citation omitted) (referring to her refinement in Lynch, see supra notes 14-30 and accompa-
nying text)). See also Developments, supra note 1, at 1647 ("Justice O'Connor has recently reformu-
lated the Lemon test in an effort better to achieve the establishment clause's core purpose... "). But
see Paulsen, Religion, Equality and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 311, 352-353 (1986) (arguing that Justice O'Connor's approach
will take the Court further from the history behind the first amendment because it relies on political
status rights rather than religious status rights).
78 Justice O'Connor's purpose prong states that legislatures can pass no law with the intent to
endorse religion. The first amendment states Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion. On the other hand the current Lemon test says the legislatures must have a secular pur-
pose in enacting a law. This is a significant difference because the language changes the focus of the
Court's inquiry. The first amendment language and O'Connor's test allows the Court to focus on
the evil (endorsing/establishing religion) and if no evil is found, the constitutionality is presumed.
Therefore, more church and state intermingling will be tolerated by the Court and more reliance will
be placed on Congress to abide by the Constitution. On the other hand, the Lemon test forces the
Court to find a valid motivation behind the legislative action (a secular purpose) or strike down the
legislation. Thus, in borderline cases, less intermingling will be allowed by the Court.
79 See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
80 See supra note 22.
81 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
82 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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ity religions. Although this prong does not have a strong basis in the
language of the first amendment, the fact that Justice Scalia believes the
first amendment needs to change with the times to retain its meaning
83
would allow him to adopt it. With the development of numerous minor-
ity religions and the extremist positions of many of these religions, the
protection of their views become more and more vital to their continued
existence. s 4 Therefore, adoption of the second prong of Justice
O'Connor's test seems to be consistent with Justice Scalia's beliefs.
The final prong of Lemon, no excessive entanglement, 5 has been
limited to "institutional entanglement" by Justice O'Connor. In fact, in
one case she questioned the continued use of this prong and stated she
would not hesitate to uphold a law even though it requires some entan-
glement.86 It seems, from his dissent in Edwards, that Justice Scalia feels
the same way. He realizes that in some situations government may actu-
ally have to advance religion.8 7 It seems likely that he would take a posi-
tion similar to that taken by Justice O'Connor in upholding a statute
despite some entanglement. Under his beliefs of separation of powers
and judicial restraint he would defer to the legislature if no clear case of
entanglement is shown.
One may argue that none of these prongs have any basis in the lan-
guage of the first amendment and that Justice Scalia would like to see
total abandonment of the Lemon test. Remembering his emphasis on the
status quo, 8 however, he would probably prefer a reformulation of the
Lemon test.8 9 In adopting Justice O'Connor's test he will be able to pro-
vide the clarity and predictability that he values so highly when dealing
with the law.
83 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
84 The extremist position of some minority religions is of such importance to their beliefs that
the slightest infringement on those beliefs may have a dramatic effect on the continued existence of
their religion. The Court, as protector of minority rights, must assure that these minority beliefs are
not infringed on by the majority. (For example see Int'l Society For Krishna Consciousness v. Bar-
ber, 650 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the Krishna practice of sankirtan is deserving of
protection under the first amendment); McMurdie V. Doutt, 468 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Ohio 1979)
(allowing first amendment protection of solicitation of funding and lecturing by The Unification
Church (Moonies)).
85 See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
86 See supra note 28.
87 Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2595 (stating three situations where advancement may be necessary:
(1) a state may have to advance religion in an attempt to prevent inhibiting religion; (2) advancement
may be required by the free exercise clause; (3) voluntary governmental accommodation). See also
Scalia, supra note 11, at 174.
88 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
89 The Lemon test has stood for seventeen years and undoubtedly would be considered long-
standing case doctrine which should not be completely abandoned but rather reformed to meet with
the proper views of the first amendment's establishment clause.
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IV. Conclusion
In Edwards v. Aguillard, Justice Scalia plainly and firmly rejected the
first prong of the Lemon test. His strong beliefs in separation of powers,
judicial restraint, and the intent of the framers will most likely lead him in
a direction similar to that ofJustice O'Connor's. This leaves the Court in
a four to four stalemate in deciding the continued use of the now articu-
lated Lemon test. Therefore, the jurisprudential views of the newest ap-
pointee to the court, Justice Kennedy, will be the decisive factor for the
future of Lemon. If the Lemon test is discarded there is a strong possibility
that the replacement test will allow much more intermingling between
church and state.90
Jay Schlosser
90 See supra note 29. See also Marcotte, New Kid on the Block; Scalia Seen as a Charming Conservative
With Ability to Effect Compromises, 72 ABAJ. 20 (Aug. 1, 1986) (stating thatJustice Scalia has a tolerant
view of government and church relations).
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